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Abstract A common complaint about conciliatory approaches to disagreement is
that they are self-defeating or incoherent because they ‘call for their own rejection’.
This complaint seems to be rather influential but it isn’t clear whether conciliatory
views call for their own rejection or what, if anything, this tells us about the
coherence of such views. We shall look at two ways of developing this self-defeat
objection and we shall see that conciliatory views emerge unscathed. A simple
version of the self-defeat objection leaves conciliatory views untouched. A subtle
version of the objection contains a subtle but overlooked flaw. If the conciliatory
view is right, it might be right to be dogmatically conciliatory (i.e., to continue to be
conciliatory however objectionable this might seem to ourselves and to others).
Keywords Disagreement ! Epistemic rationality ! Evidence
‘‘It was never contended or conceited by a sound, orthodox utilitarian, that the
lover should kiss his mistress with an eye to the common weal’’ (Austin 1832:
118).
1 Introduction
What should you do if you and a recognized peer discover that you disagree about
some proposition? According to a simple version of a conciliatory view, you and
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your peer should (probably) suspend judgment.1 On one way of developing this
view, you and your peer each acquire a defeating reason. It undercuts the rational
force of the evidence that you both took to support your positions. As things stand, it
is not rational to remain committed without thinking the matter through again,
gathering evidence, thinking about ways that you or your peer could have
mishandled the evidence, etc.
The conciliatory view I have in mind is restricted in a number of ways that will
simplify discussion. It pertains to full belief, not partial belief or degrees of belief. It
tells us nothing about cases where one peer believes and the other suspends
judgment. It might be hedged to handle cases where your peer’s response is too
bizarre to take seriously. The addition of constraints and an exception clause to
exclude cases of apparent severe cognitive malfunction do nothing to address the
worry that is the focus of this paper, so I hope the readers will humor me and focus
their attention on the specific difficulty that is the focus of this paper. The problem
that we will discuss is the charge that even a restricted and qualified conciliatory
view is incoherent because it is self-defeating.2 If the objection has any force against
a hedged and limited conciliatory view (CV hereafter), it threatens a broader class of
conciliatory approaches and tells us something important about epistemic norms in
general.
In the next section, I shall set out a version of the self-defeat objection to CV and
argue that this objection misses its intended target. CV gets off on a technicality. We
shall then consider a retooled version of the objection, one that gets to the heart of
the objection against CV. We shall see that the retooled version of the objection
fails, too. The failure should be instructive.
2 The simple self-defeat objection
Elga (2010) and Plantinga (2000) have both claimed in print that CV is, in some
sense, self-defeating. The former says that this means that the view is incoherent
because it ‘calls for its own rejection’ and gives us ‘inconsistent advice’. The latter
that the view is ‘self-referentially inconsistent’ (2000: 522). One might think that if
these charges were fairly applied to CV, they would show that CV was not true.
Let us focus on Elga’s formulation of the objection. He notes that it should be
possible for there to be a disagreement about CV between two recognized peers
(e.g., you and Tilda). You both have the same evidence, the same concern for
1 For defenses of conciliatory views, see Bogardus (2009), Christensen (2013), Cohen (2013), Feldman
(2006), Horowitz and Sliwa (2015), Littlejohn (2013), and Matheson (2015). I have inserted the
qualification (i.e., ‘probably’) because there are difficult questions about how we ought to respond when
someone we have believed to be a peer believes something we take to be deeply irrational. For discussion,
see Lackey (2008). Her view might be a target of a self-defeat objection, so readers should see what I am
proposing here as a potential defence of her view against an objection typically directed towards CV. It’s
an interesting question whether the proponents of the conciliatory view might take on her positive
proposals.
2 See Elga (2010) and Plantinga (2000) for important statements of the self-defeat objection. Because
Elga’s discussion is more detailed, the discussion focuses on his objection(s).
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settling the relevant questions correctly, the same levels of intelligence, and so it
seems that the two of you should be on par. Upon discovering that you disagree
about CV, the observation that Tilda believes CV to be false means that CV tells
you that you now have a powerful reason not to believe CV.
Under these conditions, Elga says that CV ‘calls for its own rejection’. To help us
see why this is bad, he offers us this example:
Suppose that Consumer Reports says, ‘‘Buy only toaster X,’’ while Smart
Shopper says, ‘‘Buy only toaster Y.’’ And suppose that Consumer Reports also
says, ‘‘Consumer Reports is worthless. Smart Shopper magazine is the ratings
magazine to follow.’’ Then Consumer Reports offers inconsistent advice about
toasters. For, one the one hand, it says directly to buy only Toaster X. But, on
the other hand, it also says to trust Smart Shopper, which says to buy only
Toaster Y. And it is impossible to follow both pieces of advice…Moral:… no
inductive method can coherently recommend a competing inductive method
over itself… it is incoherent for an inductive method to recommend two
incompatible responses to a single course of experience. But that is exactly
what a method does if it ever recommends a competing method over itself.
(Elga 2010: 181).3
The example is intended to show that there could be no (genuine) norm that says
that we ought to follow Consumer Report’s recommendations since there could be
situations in which this norm tells that we ought to respond in two (or more ways)
that would be incompatible. In this case, it does so by both telling us to do one thing
and follow another norm that tells us to do something incompatible with that. CV is
supposed to tell us to follow norms like this.
The problem with this objection is not with the assumption that no genuine norm
could tell us that we ought to / and ought not / under conditions that we could find
ourselves in, but with the assumption that this is what CV does. Look closely. As
stated, CV tells us that a thinker has a defeater when she finds herself in a situation
of peer disagreement about CV. The defeater is a reason to decrease her confidence
and/or suspend. The view says nothing further. If all it tells a thinker is that she
should not believe CV, it does not offer the thinker inconsistent advice.4
Readers might think that something of the original objection remains. The idea
might be put this way. The reason that CV is incoherent is not that it says that it’s
possible for a thinker to acquire evidence that requires her not to believe CV, but
3 The example is inspired by one from Lewis (1971). We should note two things about this passage. The
first is that it uses the idea of an inductive method. According to Lewis, an inductive method is, ‘a
systematic way of letting the available evidence govern your degree of belief’ (1971: 54). The second is
that there is a subtle difference between the features of inductive methods that interest Lewis and Elga.
Lewis was concerned with inductive methods that are ‘immodest’ in the sense that they would claim that
they have the best estimated accuracy of the methods under consideration (1971: 55). In our discussion of
CV, we are looking at a view that (allegedly) tells us that we ought to prefer a rival view. It doesn’t seem
that CV says that a rival ought to be preferred because it expects the rival to be more accurate. Thus, it’s
unclear how the defect that Elga thinks he’s found in CV is connected to Lewis’ notion of immodesty.
4 Christensen (2013) and Littlejohn (2013) observed that Elga’s self-defeat objection requires some kind
of level-bridging principle. We discuss rational bridging in §2.1.
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that CV implies this and implies that we should continue to be conciliatory in the
face of peer disagreement.
This objection is not convincing as it is stated. In Elga’s example, Consumer
Reports tells a shopper who ought to buy one toaster to buy Toaster X and to buy
Toaster Y. Since these are distinct toasters, it would be impossible to for someone to
do this and do all and only what she ought to do (i.e., buy one toaster). The relevant
notion of incoherence is that it enjoins an agent to respond in two incompatible
ways to her practical situation. (Essentially, the norm that enjoins us to follow the
guidance of Consumer Reports generates dilemmas.) There is no such incompat-
ibility, however, in the injunction to suspend judgment on CV and to continue to be
conciliatory. Much in the way that Austin’s lovers are perfectly capable of kissing
and thereby following the recommendation to contribute to the common weal
without thinking anything about the common weal when kissing, a conciliatory
thinker can continue to suspend when peers disagree without having any attitudes at
all towards CV. The two things recommended (i.e., being conciliatory on some
contested propositions, suspending on CV) are perfectly possible to do together.
Thus, they aren’t incompatible. Thus, if CV is incoherent, it is not because it does
what Consumer Reports does (i.e., require an individual to do two things that are
impossible to do together). The simple objection simply misses its intended target.5
3 The subtle self-defeat objection
The proponents of CV might agree with Elga that there are possible situations in
which they ought to suspend judgment on whether CV is correct. We can concede
this and still coherently maintain that we ought to conform to CV’s norms.6 This
might mean that we sometimes ought to, say, suspend judgment when we acquire a
defeater even if we also ought to suspend judgment on whether the norm that
requires this is correct, but perhaps this isn’t the end of the world.7 Just as there is
5 If this is correct, we do not need to appeal to Bogardus’ (2009: 333) suggestion that we have a special
rational insight into the truth of CV or Matheson’s (2015: 156) suggestion that we should sometimes
follow higher-order prescriptions even if they require us to ‘do’ other than everything CV would say we
ought to do. Such suggestions might be correct, but we don’t yet need to break the glass and reach for
something interesting (i.e., controversial and/or imaginative) to address the simple challenge to CV. Up to
this point, we can get by simply by clarifying the content of the view.
6 To conform to a norm in the relevant sense is to simply do things or be a way that does not ensure that
the norm is violated. To comply with a norm is to conform by virtue of a belief that the norm’s
application condition is met and conform out of respect for the norm’s normative force. We cannot
comply with a norm that we believe is no norm at all, but we have probably all conformed to the norm
that enjoins us not to eat the neighbour’s pets and hopefully have done so unthinkingly.
7 An anonymous referee wanted to know whether my defence of CV implies that we should sometimes
be epistemically akratic in some cases of disagreement about disagreement. At this stage of the
discussion, I have suggested that the proponents of CV might have to admit that they ought to suspend
even when they ought not believe that suspension is required. This isn’t, to my mind, a form of epistemic
akrasia, but things might get slightly more uncomfortable later on. We shall see that one might ultimately
want to say, in response to Elga, that there are situations in which we ought to suspend and ought to
believe that we ought to believe rather than suspend. We can undercut Elga’s objection if we embrace this
kind of level-splitting, but we shall see that this kind of level-splitting might not be required by my
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nothing incoherent in the idea that we ought to, say, act like utilitarians while
believing nothing about the virtues of the utilitarian framework, there is nothing
incoherent in the idea that we ought to, say, be conciliatory in the way that non-
dogmatic people are while suspending judgment on whether CV’s norms are
correct. At the very least, CV does not require us to respond in multiple ways that
are incompatible. Thus, if the view is incoherent, more needs to be said to show this.
Elga anticipates this worry. What he says in response to this worry gives us the
subtle objection to CV. In my view, it is the more important and interesting
objection to CV. He asks us to consider a situation in which two peers who discover
that they have incompatible views about how to respond to disagreement (‘C’ and
‘D’ stand for these views about how to handle disagreement). CV, Elga says, tells us
that the thinker who believed C ought to abandon her belief in C and increase her
confidence in D. Once we agree to this much, Elga thinks that C is shown to be
incoherent:
… [N]otice that, when one shifts one’s view about the right way to respond to
disagreement, one should correspondingly shift the way one responds to
subsequent disagreements. In particular, when the above subject shifts his
confidence away from view C and toward view D, that should correspondingly
change the inductive method he implements. It will not be as dramatic a
change as if he had become completely converted to view D, but it will be a
change nonetheless. In other words, even in this sort of case, view C calls for a
change in inductive method. And for certain choices of view D, view C calls
for a change to a competing inductive method (2010: 182, fn. 8).
This objection involves some subtlety that was missing from the simple objection.
This objection suggests that the simple response to the simple objection couldn’t
suffice to save CV from self-defeat worries because it doesn’t address the part of the
story in which someone moves from having allegiance only to CV to a state of mind
in which they think there is some chance that some rival view is the correct one. In
this state of mind, Elga thinks that the thinker ought to follow some new inductive
method. If we continue to say that they ought to follow the inductive method
recommended by CV, we have our incoherence. No thinker could possibly follow
both methods since they offer incompatible advice. If we try to avoid this
incoherence by saying that people ought to follow the new inductive method
exclusively, we avoid incoherence but we have abandoned CV.
The subtle self-defeat argument thus seems to do what I have claimed the simple
objection fails to do, which is to identify an actual inconsistency in the guidance that
CV issues. It arises because CV (allegedly) tells a thinker to do a number of things
that she cannot possibly do at once:
Footnote 7 continued
response to Elga. If readers like the idea that some kinds of epistemic akrasia are rational, they should like
one version of my response to Elga. If readers dislike the idea that it can be rational to suspend on whether
p when we rationally believe a method that says that we ought to believe p, they will hopefully like a
different version of my response to Elga.
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(a) The thinker who knows of the disagreement about CV ought to suspend on
CV/decrease her confidence in CV;
(b) Because of (a), she ought to increase her confidence in some competing
inductive method;
(c) Because of (b), she ought to conform to a new inductive method, one that
takes account of her newfound confidence in the new inductive method and
thus differs from the inductive method sanctioned by CV.
The inconsistency would arise because CV would continue to tell an agent that she
ought to conform to CV but would also (allegedly) issue guidance that was
incompatible with the guidance of the method mentioned in (c).
In the passage quoted above, it’s clear that Elga is relying on something like this
proposal to generate the inconsistency:
EP: When a thinker shifts her confidence away from the belief that she ought
to conform to inductive method A towards the view that she ought to conform
to conform to inductive method B, she should correspondingly change the
inductive method she implements.
It isn’t entirely clear what Elga thinks the thinker ought to change her inductive
method to when these changes in confidence occur because it might be that the
agent’s confidence is distributed between two inductive methods that offer
incompatible advice and resist being harmonised. (Imagine someone recommending
that we strike a compromise between one group that is calling for the equal
treatment of two groups and another group that is calling for unequal treatment. It’s
not easy to see what a compromise might look like here.) It doesn’t really matter for
our purposes what specific alternative Elga thinks ought to be adopted when the
shift occurs and someone decreases confidence in CV and, say, increases confidence
in some kind of steadfast view, provided that the shift is to an inductive method that
offers guidance that clashes with the guidance provided by CV. Let’s not worry
about how we can recover the right inductive method in cases of divided confidence.
Let me note a few things about Elga’s Principle, EP. It looks similar to the
Enkratic Requirement. What EP says, roughly, is that when we come to believe that
some method is correct, we shouldn’t both believe that the method is correct and fail
to believe in ways that conform to its directives. So, in essence, EP states that there
is some kind of interesting normative connection between the following items:
beliefs about the inductive methods we ought to follow, which are things that say
that we ought or ought not have such and such attitudes under such and such
conditions; beliefs about the conditions we’re in, and the beliefs, disbeliefs, and
suspensions covered by these methods. What the Enkratic Requirement says,
roughly, is we shouldn’t both believe that we ought or ought not have certain
attitudes and fail to have the attitudes that ‘fit’ with these normative beliefs.8 In
essence, the Enkratic Requirement says that there is some kind of interesting
normative connection between the following items: beliefs about what we ought or
8 For our purposes, think of normative beliefs as beliefs about what we ought to believe or beliefs about
norms, methods, etc. that tell us what we ought to believe when certain conditions obtain.
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ought not believe and the beliefs, disbeliefs, or suspensions these normative beliefs
are about.
On its face, it seems that EP would be false if the Enkratic Requirement were not
genuine. If there were no interesting normative or rational connection between, say,
the belief that we ought to believe p and the belief that p, we shouldn’t expect there
to be any interesting normative or rational connection between beliefs about
methods that tell us what we ought to believe under certain conditions and the
beliefs themselves. If rationality were to say that it can (contrary to what the
Enkratic Requirement states) be fully rational to believe in ways that clash with our
fully rational beliefs about what we ought to believe, it couldn’t then say that
rationality requires us to make sure that our beliefs about which inductive methods
are correct mesh with the beliefs, disbeliefs, or suspensions they prescribe. The
rational connections between, say, our beliefs concerning CV and various beliefs,
suspensions, and disbeliefs would be mediated, in part, by the justification we had to
believe that, say, CV directed us to believe, disbelieve, or suspend in certain kinds
of cases. If we’re rationally permitted to believe p when we believe that we ought
not believe p, it doesn’t make sense that rationality would insist that it would be
wrong to believe p just because we rationally believed that some method is correct
that tells us that we ought to believe p in the situation we’re in. The main difference
between EP and the Enkratic Requirement, so far as I can see, is that EP says that
there is a rational or normative connection between attitudes about attitudes we
ought to have in a wide range of cases including the present one and the attitudes we
have in the present case while the Enkratic Requirement is only concerned with a
normative connection between normative beliefs about the attitudes we ought or
ought not have in the present case and the attitudes we have in that case.
I have two reasons for mentioning the connections between EP and the Enkratic
Requirement. The first is that we know that people often say that the Enkratic
Requirement can be read in different ways. It might be false on one reading but
correct on another (e.g., its narrow-scope reading might be false even if its wide-
scope reading yields a genuine rational requirement). If that’s true of the Enkratic
Requirement, we should expect that the same holds true for EP. The second is that it
seems that a prima facie plausible case can be made that there is a tension between
the Enkratic Requirement and other attractive rational norms or requirements. If
that’s so, we should expect that there might be similar problems with combining EP
with these further rational norms or requirements. I’ll have more to say about the
potential conflicts between these further norms and EP or the Enkratic Requirement,
but we first need to say something about the different ways we might read EP.
As Broome (1999) noted, the Enkratic Requirement can be read as having
narrow- or wide-scope:
ERn: If one believes that one ought to believe p, one ought to believe p.
ERw One ought to see to it that one does not both: believe that one ought to
believe p and fail to believe p.
We might think that only one of these captures the kernel of truth contained in the
idea that rational thinkers have first-order attitudes and normative beliefs about such
attitudes that cohere or mesh. If the Enkratic Requirement can be read in two ways,
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we should expect the same is true of Elga’s Principle. There is the narrow-scope
reading:
EPn: If a thinker shifts her confidence away from the belief that she ought to
conform to inductive method A towards the view that she ought to conform to
inductive method B, she ought to change the inductive method she
implements.
And there is the wide-scope reading:
EPw: A thinker should see to it that: she does not shift her confidence away
from the belief that she ought to conform to inductive method A towards the
view that she ought to conform to inductive method B and fail to change the
inductive method she implements.
To evaluate Elga’s argument properly, we need to decide whether it is concerned
with narrow- or wide-scope requirements.
Let’s start with the narrow-scope reading:
The Narrow-Scope Reading
Suppose a thinker believes to some degree that she ought not follow inductive
method A and should follow inductive method B instead. If so, she ought not
follow inductive method A but should follow some alternative that takes
account of her beliefs concerning these two inductive methods. But inductive
method A says that she ought to follow that very inductive method. So,
inductive method A is spurious.
There are two obvious problems with this argument. The first is that it seems to
overgeneralize. If there are any norms or inductive methods at all, there must be
some that we ought to follow even when we suspect that they might not be genuine.
This argument can be deployed to rule out these inductive methods. Second, nobody
should think that a belief about which norm or method to follow by itself determines
whether we ought to follow a norm or method. Some of our beliefs about norms and
methods, after all, are deeply irrational or confused (e.g., if someone irrationally
comes to believe that we ought to believe some contradictions, this by itself
shouldn’t weaken any standing prohibition against believing such things). Because
of this, we should reject the narrow-scope reading of EP. On this reading, we can
‘detach’ the conclusion that we are free to believe against the prescriptions of some
inductive method simply because we have some possibly irrational degree of
confidence in a competing one. Of course, once we reject EP on the narrow-scope
reading, we reject the crucial premise in the argument.
Because the narrow-scope reading of EP doesn’t support any interesting
arguments about norms or inductive methods, we should focus on the wide-scope
reading. EPw tells us that a thinker should not both shift her beliefs about which
norms to conform to and fail to change her inductive method. It doesn’t follow from
EPw that someone who changes her beliefs about what methods to follow ought to
change which methods she follows. To derive any conclusions about which methods
a thinker ought to follow from EPw, we would have to establish that this thinker has
changed her beliefs about which methods to follow and ought to believe that she
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ought to follow this new method. To establish anything about the first-order
attitudes the thinker ought to have or ought not have, we need EPw to serve as a
bridge that connects the rational status of the normative beliefs or beliefs about the
methods to follow to the first-order attitudes that these normative beliefs or methods
concern and we need some way to show that the thinker’s new beliefs about CV
(i.e., that she ought to follow something other than CV) are the beliefs that she ought
to have. So, in addition to a defence of the possibility of rational bridging (i.e.,
connecting the rational status of beliefs about the methods to the rational status of
the beliefs that these methods direct us to form), we need a defence of rational
conversion. To tell this story, we need to appeal to some further norm or norms that
could explain why a thinker who initially, say, rationally believed CV should now
believe that CV is incorrect and should believe instead that some rival view is
correct.
The goal, then, would be to defend the possibility rational bridging and rational
conversion so that we would have a defence of the crucial premises in this
argument:
The Better Wide-Scope Reading
Suppose a thinker believes that she ought not follow CV and that she ought to
follow some rival inductive method instead. And suppose that this is what the
thinker ought to believe (e.g., because this is what her evidence supports). She
ought to see to it she doesn’t both believe she ought to follow this alternative
inductive method to CV and continue to follow CV. So, it’s not true that she
ought to continue to follow CV. So, she ought to follow this alternative to CV
instead.
If we can find good reasons to accept the premises of this argument, we should
finally have what we need to vindicate Elga’s self-defeat objection to CV.
3.1 The subtle flaw in the subtle argument
There is a subtle flaw in the subtle argument. The success of the argument depends,
in part, upon whether rational conversion is correct. It succeeds only if it’s possible
for someone who, say, initially believes CV ends up believing that some rival view
is correct and thereby ends up believing something that she ought to believe. The
success of the argument also depends, in part, upon whether rational bridging is
correct. It succeeds only if there is some necessary connection between the rational
status of our normative beliefs or our beliefs about the methods we ought to follow
and the attitudes that these beliefs or methods direct us to have. I think that a decent
case can be made for rational conversion and a decent case can be made for rational
bridging. The problem, however, is that there doesn’t seem to view that would serve
Elga’s purposes that incorporates rational conversion and rational bridging.
Why would someone accept the possibility of rational conversion? It’s clear that
Elga assumes that rational conversion is possible and I can see two potential
motivations for it. First, we might appeal to some evidentialist norm to explain how
rational conversion is possible:
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Evidentialism: If a thinker is trying to settle the question whether p, she ought
to have the attitude (belief, disbelief, or suspension) that fits her evidence (i.e.,
she ought to believe if she has sufficient evidence for belief, disbelieve if she
has sufficient evidence for believing the negation, and ought to suspend
otherwise).9
The idea, simply put, might be that in some cases of disagreement about
disagreement, we get sufficient evidence to believe that some rival to CV is correct.
This, in turn, explains why we ought to believe that this rival is correct. Second, we
might read CV itself as saying that because of the evidence or because of something
else a thinker ought to end up believing that some rival to CV is correct. Either way,
the underlying idea is that some norm or norms say that a situation can arise (e.g., a
kind of disagreement about disagreement case) where it’s rational to believe that
some rival to CV is correct. Either way, the explanation is that there is a norm that
functions like the evidentialist norm in that it says that the evidential situation
requires the agent to go beyond abandoning her belief in CV and to embrace some
rival.10
If we have some norm or norms that explains how rational conversion is possible,
we still need a norm or norms that explains how the relevant kind of rational
bridging could be possible. As we’ve seen, we need ERw and EPw to explain how
rational bridging is possible. The problem with appealing to ERw (and, by extension,
9 An anonymous referee noted that we might want to revise this so that it says that we ought to believe
what we have decisive or conclusive evidence to believe as opposed to what we have sufficient evidence
to believe. For our purposes, I would be happy to work with the assumption that we have decisive or
conclusive evidence in the relevant cases. My hope is that we can avoid difficult questions about the
difference between sufficient evidence and decisive evidence in the relevant range of cases because it
seems that the reasons for thinking that we can or cannot have sufficient evidence for believing the
relevant propositions are, inter alia, reasons for thinking that we can or cannot have decisive evidence in
these cases. I wanted to say away from the language of ‘conclusive’ because that talk might carry too
much baggage (e.g., it might bring to mind the idea of evidence that either rules out the possibility of
error or is such that we would not have had it if we had erred). The main thing that matters for our
purposes is that a thinker who is concerned with settling some question can find that she ought to believe
certain things thanks to her evidence.
10 In a previous draft, an anonymous referee raised the worry that I had said that evidentialism played a
role in supporting rational conversion. The referee thought that it was strange to import this norm since
the objection is a self-defeat objection. The objection wouldn’t be a self-defeat objection if it required us
to invoke additional norms since the objection would really be better directed at a collection of norms
(e.g., evidentialism, CV, and some Enkratic Requirement) than CV itself. For my part, I suspect that
something like the evidentialist norm is operative in Elga’s thinking about the objection, but the main
point that I want to make here doesn’t turn on which norm underwrites rational conversion. Ultimately,
the problem is that if we include any norm (e.g., an evidentialist norm, CV) that would underwrite rational
conversion, it shouldn’t be combined with one that underwrites rational bridging. Moreover, if I’m right
that we need an additional norm to explain how rational bridging is possible, the same worries about
whether the objection is truly a self-defeat objection remains. If the incoherence arises because, say, we
combine CV with EPw or the Enkratic Requirement, we have the option of avoiding the incoherence by
rejecting the norms that underwrite rational bridging as opposed to CV. The anonymous referee rightly
asked whether my defence of CV requires us to allow for a kind of rational akrasia (e.g., that it can be
rational to believe what we rationally believe to be irrational). It’s a good question. I will outline a view
that doesn’t require us to embrace the possibility of rational akrasia, but one option that I don’t argue
against here is to adopt a level-splitting view on which rational conversion is possible but rational
bridging is not.
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EPw) is that ERw generates ‘fixed-points’. A fixed-point, for our purposes, is a truth
about the requirements of rationality that a thinker cannot rationally believe to be
false. The existence of fixed-points places constraints on the range of propositions
about rationality that a thinker might rationally believe. These constraints make it
difficult to defend the position that rational conversion and rational bridging are
both possible. The possibility of the relevant rational bridge might make us sceptical
about the possibility of the relevant kind of rational conversion.
To see why, let’s consider this limited fixed-point thesis:
FPT: If an agent ought not /, she ought not believe that she ought to /.
To see how ERw generates fixed-points, let’s suppose that the agent is in a case in
which she ought not /. If she’s in this situation and she were to believe that she
ought to /, she would either satisfy ERw but violate this antecedent prohibition
against /-ing or she would conform to this antecedent requirement not to / but then
violate ERw by failing to / in accordance with her judgment. Thus, if ERw is
correct, when there are things that we ought not believe, there are correlative
constraints on what we ought to believe about what we ought to believe. FPT gives
us this surprising connection between the truth of some normative propositions and
the rational or normative status of beliefs that concern these propositions—the
prohibition against /-ing comes with a prohibition against believing that /-ing is
mandatory.11 Fixed-points, as we shall see, cause trouble for the subtle argument.
There are different explanations in the literature as to how there could be fixed-
points of the kind I’ve suggested come with ERw. The language of fixed-points, to
my mind, encourages us to think of things this way. There are certain requirements
of rationality that are fixed and that apply to all of us regardless of how things seem
to us. Because of these requirements, it turns out that our mistaken beliefs about
what they require are themselves rational failings. According to Titelbaum, the
reason that, as he puts it, the relevant mistakes about rationality are themselves
mistakes of rationality (i.e., rational failings) is that we all have propositional
justification to believe the relevant truths about rationality.12 According to
Littlejohn, the reason that there are these fixed-points is that we’re guilty of
rational failings whenever we are insufficiently responsive to certain features of the
situations we’re in. Just as we can manifest this unresponsiveness by forming the
11 Part of what is surprising about this is that many people have seemed to think that rational
requirements like ERw only impose rational requirements on combinations of attitudes. Titelbaum
(2015b) argues rather persuasively that there must be more to rationality than just wide-scope coherence
requirements because narrow-scope rational requirements can be derived from wide-scope requirements.
Notice that the discussion above does not quite follow the contours of Titelbaum’s argument since the
argument for fixed-points sketched above assumed that there some rational requirements that were not
assumed to be wide-scope.
12 There is the further related view that says that the relevant truths about rationality are such that we
cannot have false but rational beliefs about them because the relevant truths are luminous or lustrous. We
might think of Kiesewetter (2016) and Smithies (2012a) as coming close to defending such a view. I’ll
have more to say about such views below, but I don’t think that Titelbaum defends this kind of view
because I don’t think that he thinks that we’re necessarily in the right position to make good use of the
propositional justification he thinks we have for believing the relevant truths about the requirements of
rationality.
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wrong beliefs (e.g., believing in ways that are dogmatic by ignoring the opinions of
peers or experts who disagree), we can manifest this same unresponsiveness by
believing that we ought to form these problematic beliefs (e.g., by endorsing norms
that, inter alia, require us to respond to disagreements dogmatically).
I think that it’s helpful to think of these approaches to fixed-points as bottom-up.
The relevant truths about what is rational to believe have a kind of explanatory
priority and they somehow ground further requirements on our beliefs about what
we ought to believe. We can contrast bottom-up approaches with top-down
approaches to fixed-points. On these top-down approaches, we should really think of
fixed-points as fixed-connections between the rational status of some normative
beliefs and the rational status of the responses that they concern.13 Once some belief
about the requirements of rationality secures its status as a rational belief, this belief
helps to shape or mould the rational requirements that apply to the attitudes that it
concerns. Part of the explanation as to why, say, rationality requires you to be
conciliatory or steadfast might be that you’ve come to rationally believe that this is
what rationality requires of you. Had you come to rationally believe that rationality
required something else, our top-down view says that it might have been that
rationality required something else from you. These beliefs about the requirements
of rationality don’t miss their targets because the place of the targets is partially
determined by the rational attitudes we have about them.
Let’s consider the subtle self-defeat argument from the perspective of a bottom-
up approach to FPT and ERw. The idea behind the bottom-up view is that there will
be some things that are forbidden and that their status as forbidden cannot shift or
change because a thinker gets evidence that suggests that the forbidden things are
required. Someone who accepts FPT on this understanding will either say that it’s
impossible for a thinker to have strong and undefeated reason to believe the relevant
normative falsehoods (e.g., Titelbaum 2015a) or that the evidence that a thinker gets
for believing the relevant falsehoods fail to justify the false normative beliefs (e.g.,
Littlejohn 2018). On Titelbaum’s approach, evidentialism or CV might be true and
it might be compatible with ERw but we would never get a body of evidence that
justifies believing that we ought to follow an inductive method other than the true
one. On Littlejohn’s approach, a norm that says that we ought to believe falsehoods
about what we ought to believe is itself false. If so, we cannot assume that we can
have evidence that justifies believing CV and evidence that later justifies believing
some rival view is correct. On this view, the existence of the rational bridge tells us
that we cannot assume that it’s possible for thinkers to be rational in believing CV
and rational in believing that some rival view is correct. We cannot assume that a
thinker ought to believe that CV is incorrect unless we can assume that CV is indeed
incorrect.14
13 See Skipper (forthcoming) and [] for more discussion of how talk of fixed-points might be misleading.
14 Let us return to the anonymous referee’s concern. If we set evidentialism aside and focus just on CV,
what should we say? I think we can say one of two things. The first point is that some who have defended
CV seem to think that CV does not tell us to believe that some rival view is correct, only that there are
situations in which we ought to suspend judgment on whether CV is correct. If CV is read this way, then
we would need some additional norm to get the objection to CV going. If, however, we understand CV in
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A further possible bottom-up approach would be one that says that the relevant
truths about rationality are luminous or lustrous truths that tell us how all rational
thinkers ought to respond to the situations that they’re in. They would be luminous
if their truth were sufficient to ensure that everyone was in a position to know them
and lustrous if their truth sufficed to ensure that everyone was in a position to
justifiably believe them.15 If they shined this way, perhaps this is why it wouldn’t be
rational to form false beliefs about them.16
There are a number ofways to develop this bottom-up approach. It is clear that if the
bottom-up understanding of FPT is correct, the subtle self-defeat argument fails. We
cannot assume that there is a body of evidence that a thinker could have that justifies
believing that she ought to follow an inductive method that differs from the one
recommended by CV unless we assume that CV is not true. In the context of trying to
argue that CV is not true, we cannot help ourselves to the assumption that it is not.
There is a further problem if we appeal to the luminosity of rational requirements
to explain rational bridging. This proposal doesn’t help Elga’s argument in the
present setting. The self-defeat problem only gets off the ground if we think that a
rational thinker’s rational attitudes about rational requirements can rationally
change when her evidence changes (e.g., when she rationally believes CV but then
comes to rationally increase her confidence in rival views when she discovers that
people disagree with her about CV). If the truths about norms like CV were
luminous, we might expect that lots of people do have sufficient evidence to believe
the truths about the norms that govern belief, but we wouldn’t expect the people
who had this evidence to disagree with one another about what the norms are.17
Let’s consider top-down approaches to FPT and ERw. On such approaches, we
have to assume that the underlying first-order requirements are malleable.18 They
Footnote 14 continued
such a way that it tells us that we ought, given certain evidence, believe that some rival approach is
correct, then the thing for the defender of CV to say is that CV, like evidentialism, is in tension with
principles that underwrite rational bridging. If both CV and evidentialism tell us that we sometimes ought
to believe that some rival to CV is correct, then the defenders of CV should say that neither CV nor
evidentialism should be combined with EPw or ERw. At this point, CV would seem to be safe. At least, it
would be safe until we had a compelling defence of EPw and ERw.
15 See Smithies (2012b) for a discussion of the difference between the lustrous and the luminous and a
defence of the possibility of lustrous conditions in response to Williamson’s (2000) anti-luminosity
argument.
16 It is difficult to find defenders of the idea that the relevant rational requirements are luminous, but it’s
possible that Kiesewetter (2016) and Smithies (2012a) come close. For criticism of the luminosity of
norms or rational requirements, see Dutant and Littlejohn (2018), Littlejohn (2012), Sorensen (1995),
Srinivasan (2015), and Williamson (2000).
17 One could argue that the possibility of rational disagreement about the standards of rationality are
trouble for the idea that the standards are themselves luminous, but someone who believes that such
standards might be luminous might think that they would only be luminous to sufficiently rational
thinkers. Although I do not believe that normative standards or facts about what we have to do to meet
them are not luminous, nothing I say here conflicts with the suggestion that they are.
18 For defences of the malleable view, see Foley (2001) and Gibbons (2013). Bradley (2019) defends
something close to the malleable view. For critical discussion of the malleable view, see Littlejohn
(2014). It is difficult to find defenders of the idea that the relevant rational requirements are luminous, but
it’s possible that Kiesewetter (2016) and Smithies (2012a) come close.
Should we be dogmatically conciliatory?
123
would be malleable if their truth were sensitive to features of our epistemic state so
that some rational thinker in our state couldn’t be mistaken about them by virtue of
the fact that they would ‘bend’ to fit our best judgments about them. Something like
this idea seems to be what Bradley (2019) has in mind when he suggests that the
evidence we acquire about some norm can help to determine whether this norm
even applies to the thinker in question (e.g., if we acquire strong evidence that we
ought to be steadfast in the face of disagreement, this might help to explain why we
ought to be steadfast when others with different evidence about the virtues of being
conciliatory ought to be conciliatory).
The problem with views that explain FPT by positing malleable requirements is
their malleability. If Elga’s argument assumes that FPT is correct because the
requirements that govern belief are malleable, then he doesn’t need to rely on the
self-defeat argument against CV. Any argument that purports to show that the norms
that govern belief are malleable would show that there is not some fixed norm like
CV that tells us which inductive methods always ought to be followed. This would
make the self-defeat objection otiose. There is a more serious problem with this
approach. If the top-down view is true because all the norms that govern belief are
malleable, the evidentialist norm is not a genuine norm. If it is not a genuine norm, a
crucial premise in the subtle argument is false. The subtle argument wouldn’t just be
otiose, it would be unsound.
I find no reading of ERw and FPT that supports the two crucial assumptions of the
subtle argument, the possibility of rational conversion and the possibility of rational
bridging. So, I see no hope for the subtle argument. Either we cannot say that
rational thinkers can change their minds about CV or we cannot say that a thinker
ought to follow an inductive method other than CV without assuming that CV is not
a genuine norm.
At this point, I would like to make a general point about any argument about
epistemic norms that appeals to ERw and any norm like evidentialism or CV that
tells us that we ought to believe things about norms when we acquire evidence
against them. Given the plausible assumption that it is possible for a rational thinker
to be uncertain about what rationality requires of her in some given situation, we
might have good reason to think that evidentialism and ERw cannot both be true. It
might be incoherent to combine them in a single view. If so, it would be a mistake to
assume them both in trying to demonstrate the incoherence of some putative norm
like CV.
If there were a coherent view that combined ERw and evidentialism, there might
be a hope for the subtle argument, but there are reasons to be sceptical of this
combination of views.19 We can see this by thinking about the evidence of evidence
principles that would have to hold if this combination were coherent. Evidentialism
tells us that if a thinker has sufficient evidence to believe p and is actively
considering whether p, that she ought to believe p. If we combine evidentialism with
ERw and have an agent who knows that evidentialism is correct, the principle that
19 Field (forthcoming), Lasonen-Aarnio (forthcoming), Littlejohn (2018) and Worsnip (2018) discuss the
tension between these two views. What holds for evidentialism holds for CV when it is understood as a
view that tells us that we ought to believe CV is false if we acquire the right kind of evidence.
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states that sufficient evidence of sufficient evidence ensures sufficient evidence
should hold:
SESE: If A has sufficient evidence that A has sufficient evidence to believe p,
A has sufficient evidence to believe p.20
Unfortunately, this evidence of evidence principle is problematic. Let’s suppose that
evidential strength is measured probabilistically and that sufficient support requires
a degree of evidential support of sufficient strength. (The degree of support that will
be necessary will be a probability between .5 and 1.) Dorst (forthcoming) has argued
that if rationality permits us to be uncertain about what our evidence supports, the
strongest evidence of evidence principle that we can vindicate is this considerably
weaker principle:
Fact 5.5: [Pe(Pe(h) C t) C s] ? [Pe(h) C ts]
Fact 5.5 tells us that evidence of evidence places some constraints on how weak the
first-order evidence for a proposition might be, but it does not impose a constraint
strong enough to support SESE. Suppose the minimum degree of support for
believing a proposition is, say, .8 and suppose that the probability that p is .8 on
your evidence is itself .9. You would have sufficient evidence to believe that you
have sufficient evidence to believe p, but we could not assume that the evidential
probability of p is anything greater than .72.21 So, Fact 5.5 does not rule out
counterexamples to SESE. If, as Dorst argues, we cannot vindicate anything
stronger than Fact 5.5 in a framework that permits uncertainty about what our
evidence warrants [i.e., that allows that, say, Pe(h) = .8 even if Pe(Pe(h) = .8)\ 1)],
we have a good reason to believe that SESE is too strong.22
If Fact 5.5 is too weak to vindicate SESE, there is no modest view of rationality
(i.e., one that tells us that it is sometimes rationally permissible to be uncertain
about what your evidence supports and what rationality requires) that vindicates
20 Why is that? This thinker would know that for any p that she is actively considering that she ought to
believe iff she has sufficient evidence. She ought not believe if she lacks sufficient evidence. Suppose that
she lacks sufficient evidence to believe p. Evidentialism would say that she ought not believe p. FPT
would say that she ought not believe that she ought to believe p. Given that this is something that she is
actively considering, evidentialism would say that she could not have sufficient evidence to believe that
she ought to believe p. So, if she has sufficient evidence to believe that she ought to believe p, she cannot
be in a situation in which she lacks sufficient evidence to believe p. So, SESE should hold when it is
restricted to propositions that the agent is actively considering. For further discussions of level principles
like SESE and their significance for foundational issues about rationality, see Littlejohn (2018), Skipper
(forthcoming) and Worsnip (forthcoming).
21 Williamson (forthcoming) argues that even a principle as weak as Fact 5.5 is too strong. I focus on
Dorst’s discussion because he gives us the strongest principle linking higher-order and first-order
evidence that is consistent with the idea that a body of evidence can make it rational to be uncertain about
what your evidence requires from you.
22 For an argument that rationality does not require certainty about what our evidence supports, see
Roush (2018). She argues that there is no sure-loss argument for the view that rationality requires being
certain of what our evidence supports or makes rational.
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SESE. And if there is no modest view of rationality that vindicates SESE, there is no
modest view of rationality that vindicates both evidentialism and ERw. If
evidentialism is correct, the counterexamples to SESE should be counterexamples
to ERw. If ERw is correct, there will be counterexamples to evidentialism.
Someone might defend SESE in spite of this.23 If they defend SESE, they will
have to adopt the immodest view. The immodest view says that no body of evidence
can ever make it rational to be immodest (i.e., to be uncertain about what your
evidence supports and uncertain about what rationality requires). I don’t think that
it’s uncontroversial that the immodest view is false, so we shouldn’t just assume the
modest view. The problem with the immodest view in this context is that it’s hard to
see how this view could help reinstate the subtle argument against CV. It is an
implication of the immodest view that it would be irrational for someone to be
convinced of CV at one time and then later became convinced that they ought to
follow some rival inductive method. Every body of evidence at every time should
either make it certain that we ought to follow CV or that we ought to follow a rival.
The immodest view might accommodate evidentialism and ERw, but it tells us that
Elga would be wrong to think that a rational thinker might change her views about
which inductive methods to follow over time. This immodest view allows for
rational bridging, but it denies the possibility of rational conversion. So, I see no
hope for the subtle argument.
4 Conclusion
I have looked and I have tried to look carefully. I can find no combination of views
about first-order evidence and higher-order evidence that supports the simple or
subtle self-defeat argument against CV. To run the self-defeat argument against CV,
we have to appeal to a number of assumptions about rational belief and its
connection to first-order and higher-order evidence that, upon reflection, either
conflict with one another or cannot allow for the possibility that a rational thinker
might believe CV now and come to doubt it later when they observe that others
disagree. On the one hand, it seems that views that allow for a kind of level-splitting
might recommend that we continue to be conciliatory whilst we suspend judgment
on CV and other views that don’t allow for it seem to show that one or more of the
background assumptions required by Elga’s argument is false. So, I think that CV
has little to fear from the self-defeat argument. When faced with otherwise
reasonable people who dogmatically assert that we ought to be dogmatic, it’s
possible that the right response is to dogmatically cling to the general policy of not
responding dogmatically. As stated, the view doesn’t sound all that plausible, but
we have seen by now that there are coherent and defensible ways of describing the
view so that it is immune to the self-defeat objection.
23 See Skipper (forthcoming) and Tal (forthcoming) for views on which rationality doesn’t permit
uncertainty about what it requires from us.
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